The Home Office has announced:
UK identity card image unveiled
The ID card image shows the information contained on the face of the card, including photograph, name, date of birth and signature, and the card's unique design. It will hold similar information to that currently contained in the UK passport as well as a photograph and fingerprints on a secure electronic chip - linking the owner of the card securely to their unique biometric identity.
Thankfully there is no printed address on this ID Card design.
Will the Home Office Press Release use of the word "unveiled", coupled with a female photographic image of a female, cause resentment within the fundamentalist Islamic community ?
The 2006 to 2016 validity period of this specimen ID card image also implies 3 years of delays to the scheme.
It comes as no surprise, that the web link URL advertised on the back of this ID Card: www.direct.gov.uk/myid, gives a 404 error i.e. the web page does not exist.
This lack of coordination and communication between different parts of the Home Office is typical of the whole ID Cards scheme to date.
Will the ID Card number be randomly allocated, or will it betray information about the ID Card controllee, through batch sequences, which can also help to break the cryptographic protections on the Contactless / RFID chip, just as happened with the Netherlands biometric passport ?
The prefix "IDGBR" will be enough of an unencrypted identifier, which can be read remotely by "illegal" radio equipment, to snoop on British travellers, well beyond the normal very short range of the official ID Card reading equipment.
Potentially, this could also be used to trigger terrorist bombs, which only detonate, when British citizens are within the lethal radius - this is not our idea of a "security feature"!
Identity Commissioner
The Home Office takes seriously the concerns that the public have over their information being stored securely and accessed appropriately. That is why an Identity Commissioner will be appointed before ID cards are introduced to oversee operation of the service and report annually on the uses to which ID cards are put and the confidentiality and integrity of information recorded in the National Identity Register. Public panel meetings in Manchester and London will allow the public to join a conversation about the National Identity Service so their views, reactions and concerns inform the way service is developed and delivered.
Who exactly will be appointed as the virtually powerless National Identity Scheme Commissioner ?
Why should we trust the National Identity Scheme Commissioner, to provide effective checks and balances ? The Commissioner can only write an annual, censored Report to the Home Secretary, about the scheme, and the office will not have any resources to investigate individual complaints about the scheme from members of the public, and no legal powers to do anything about any such errors and failings.
The National Identity Scheme Commissioner is specifically forbidden by the terms of reference which appoint him under the Identity Cards Act 2006 section 22 Appointment of National Identity Scheme Commissioner to look into the following activities, which are exactly the secret activities which are the most likely to abuse the National Identity Register, and which therefore should be scrutinised the most:
(4) The matters to be kept under review by the Commissioner do not include--
(a) the exercise of powers which under this Act are exercisable by statutory instrument or by statutory rule for the purposes of the Statutory Rules (Northern Ireland) Order 1979 (S.I. 1979/1573 (N.I. 12));
(b) appeals against civil penalties;
(c) the operation of so much of this Act or of any subordinate legislation as imposes or relates to criminal offences;
(d) the provision of information to the Director-General of the Security Service, the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service or the Director of the Government Communications Headquarters;
(e) the provision to another member of the intelligence services, in accordance with regulations under section 21(5), of information that may be provided to that Director-General, Chief or Director;
(f) the exercise by the Secretary of State of his powers under section 38; or
(g) arrangements made for the purposes of anything mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (f).
Please support or join the cross party NO2ID Campaign, to resist the introduction of this far too expensive, insecure, privacy invasive and counterproductive ID Card scheme in the UK.
Would wrapping RFID cards, such as this, with aluminium foil stop remote interrogation?
@ microdave - yes it would, however, this could then make you very suspicious to the metal detectors and the expensive "see through your clothes" Passive Millimetre Wave, Back Scatter X-Ray, Terahertz or Ultra Wide Band imaging scanners being inflicted on travellers at airports etc. (with plans for sneaky snooping in the street).
Thanks for the reply. I think that's a chance I would take! As for the other methods you mention maybe this would help?
http://www.metacafe.com/watch/1154898/how_to_make_a_tinfoil_hat/
A few months ago, a bloke drove round San Francisco and 'harvested' numerous passport details from unwitting pedestrians that he passed. This feat was achieved despite the fact that US passport chips are supposed to be unreadable when the passport is closed.
The prospect of some nutter sitting in a café at a tourist spot somewhere hot with an 'infidel counter' running on his PDA is not as far fetched as it sounds.
Perhaps of more concern to the average infidel-in-the-street is the ease with which RF devices such as Oyster cards, building access cards or RF credit cards (coming soon to a wallet near you) can be read. You don't even need to see the card to clone it.
There are two solutions to the problem. Tinfoil underpants with a capacious back pocket will safeguard all of your RF equipped documents as well as matching any tinfoil hats that you might own.
A slightly more comfortable option is to buy an RF shielded wallet or passport case. Shielding varies from sheets of stainless steel (major surgery required if you fall over and land on your wallet) to wire mesh embedded in smart looking leather. A number of companies sell shielded money and passport wallets. Google 'rfid wallet' for details.
So is it going to be RFID even though it has smartcard terminals on the back?
@ BristolDave - you would have to try to get a straight answer on a such a technical question from the Home Office, who will dither and delay for as long as possible, and then claim that it is "commercially confidential" or a matter of "national security".
Are there any press photos of the back of the July 2009 dated ID Card which Home Secretary Alan Johnson was flashing to photographers ?
In order to be a valid international travel document, the ID Card will have to be ICAO biometric passport compliant, i.e. include a Contactless / RFID chip and embedded antenna, just like the new Passports.
The Home Office has wittered on about trying to use the existing Chip and PIN terminal network, hence the standard contact smartcard pad in the illustration.
This would be an utter security disaster since your National Identity Register data and biometrics are worth far more than the £250 per transaction limit which the Chip and PIN system is engineered to protect (most of the time), and so it would be worthwhile for attackers to spend much more money and ingenuity than they already do. in their successful breaches of Chip and PIN and bank ATMs.
As I understand it, the Home Office has chosen the RFID spec which is the least secure, because it can be read from a greater distance.
That makes me wonder what their true motivations are in introducing the ID card.
@ Faustie - that seems very similar to what happened when GSM phone technology was introduced. IIRC the opportunity was there for very secure encryption of the transmissions, but the Government forced the network operators to reduce this, so that GCHQ could listen in more easily.